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Abstract 
 
We investigate the determinants of start-up financing in 54 countries, using the 
Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) surveys for years 2001-2006. We find that 
financial liberalisation increases the total financial size of the individual start-up 
entrepreneurial project both via the increased use of external and of own funds. In 
addition, the volume of start-up finance responds positively to international capital 
inflows as represented by loans from non-resident banks and remittances, and 
negatively to the volume of offshore deposits. The positive impact of remittances on 
total volume of start-up financing is via own finance of the entrepreneur. 
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1. Introduction 
 
One of the common problems for new ventures is raising sufficient funding 
enabling them to launch and operate businesses successfully. Accordingly, finance 
availability and cost have been cited as one of the major constraints for 
entrepreneurship (Storey 1994; Beck et al. 2005; 2008; OECD 2006). The lack of credit 
history and of credible reputation distinguishes start-ups from established firms, creating 
a disadvantage for the former when it comes to the issue of funding (Huyghebaert and 
Van de Gucht 2007). Given small scale of entrepreneurial projects, a higher asymmetry 
in information and higher risk, financial institutions find it costly to monitor small 
businesses, even if advances in technology (including the risk scoring techniques) imply 
that the banking sector is capable to handle the entrepreneurial finance better than in 
the past (De la Torre et al. 2008). 
The relative difficulty of start-ups in accessing finance is likely to be aggravated by 
a weak domestic business environment, including inadequate legal frameworks and 
repressed financial systems. However, globalisation of the financial markets implies that 
the entrepreneurs are gaining more access to international financial markets, albeit 
often indirectly, via domestic banking systems. As a result, access to the international 
sources of finance may substitute for domestic institutional weaknesses. At the same 
time, this implies that entrepreneurs become particularly sensitive to the volume and the 
direction of the international flows of finance (Tornell and Westermann 2005). 
 Building on these insights, in this paper, we investigate the determinants of the 
total, own and external volume of start-up finance using the Global Entrepreneurship 
Monitor (GEM) 2001-2006 surveys. More specifically we examine the impact of the 
financial environment, property rights system and international financial flows on 
financing at the time of entrepreneurial entry, controlling for various individual 
characteristics of entrepreneurs such as their education, experience and social capital. 
In particular, our investigation focuses on the following issues: 
- Is the amount of finance used by entrepreneurs when launching their ventures 
affected by the quality of legal system and the extent of the government intervention in 
the financial sector? 
- What is the role of informal finance? 
- Are domestic sources of finance for start-ups augmented by net international 
financial flows? 
- Are those alternative sources of finance operating via enhancing external or own 
finance used by the entrepreneur? 
A comparative advantage of our research can be summarised as follows. 
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First, while existing empirical studies tend to focus on firm/entrepreneur-specific 
characteristics (Harris and Raviv 1991; Coleman 2000; Cassar 2003; Huyghebaert and 
Van de Gucht 2007), in our research we augment these with institutional country-level 
indicators. This enables us to examine the impact of the business environment on start-
up finance. Accordingly, along with individual GEM data, we use various country-level 
measures comprising a start-up contextual environment. We can use this aggregate 
data as our explanatory factors without being concerned with simultaneity bias, as the 
individual decision of a potential entrepreneur does not affect country-level institutions 
or economic development. 
Second, we explore the links between net financial flows from abroad and start-up 
finance. Apart from Giannetti and Ongena (2005) and Alfaro and Charlton (2007), this 
theme has been hardly covered in the literature. Yet as hypothesised by Tornell and 
Westermann (2005), it is the local entrepreneurial sector that is particularly sensitive to 
international financial flows. Consistent with this perspective, financial globalisation 
implies more opportunities for entrepreneurial finance, albeit at cost of higher risk of 
negative shocks. This has implications for both the way the global financial architecture 
should be designed and to the way we should respond to the financial crises.   
Third, we use the GEM data set that offers a unique opportunity to study nascent 
entrepreneurs (or start-ups; for the definition see Section Three). While firm finance 
literature abounds, it is largely centred around the established businesses. Limited 
empirical work has been done on start-up financing due to lack of data. As most studies 
use surveys of existing entrepreneurs, the potential for survivorship bias confounding 
these studies is high (on a similar note see Cassar 2003). 
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section discusses theoretical issues 
pertaining to the start-up finance. We declare explicit hypotheses to be tested. Section 
Three describes the data and methodology. Empirical results follow in Section Four. 
Finally, Section Five presents conclusions and policy implications. 
 
2. Determinants of Start-up Finance 
 
Studies on start-up financing have been mostly motivated by the arguments 
pertaining to the informational asymmetries theories  the central theme of which is that 
market imperfections lead to credit rationing. However, it is frequently overlooked that (i) 
financial globalisation may alleviate some of those constraints enhancing domestic 
supply of credit via inflow of capital from abroad (Tornell and Westermann, 2005), (ii) 
the transaction costs associated with the informational asymmetry and consequently 
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also the potential for credit rationing are strongly affected by the cross-country 
heterogeneity in the financial and legal institutions. With the development of the latter, 
the transactions costs of the financial contract should be expected to diminish.  
Existing comparative research suggests that the institutional environment, 
comprised of formal and informal rules, plays an important role in the entrepreneurship 
development, affecting individuals’ decision to enter entrepreneurship, allocation of their 
effort among its various uses (productive or unproductive), and entrepreneurial 
strategies, including financing and growth (Baumol 1990; Johnson et al. 2002; Van Stel 
et al. 2007; Ho and Wong, 2007; Aidis et al 2008, 2010; Ardagna and Lusardi 2008), but 
less is known about the impact of those factors on entrepreneurial finance. We 
distinguish the two key institutional dimensions which are likely to influence financial 
structure of startups: (1) protection of property rights; and (2) financial openness and 
financial regulatory environment. We discuss these dimensions below. 
 
2.1 Protection of Property Rights 
 
Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) see protection of property rights from expropriation 
as the key institutional dimension which they interpret in a narrow sense, as 
distinguished from the ‘contracting institutions’. The economic agents can overcome 
obstacles and deficiencies in ‘contacting institutions’ by changing the preferred form of 
contractual arrangements and developing private contracting systems. In contrast, 
instability of core property rights has a fundamental negative effect on economic activity, 
sizeable investment and new entry in particular. In an environment with weak protection 
of property rights, financial contracts are less likely to be concluded, leading to the 
underdevelopment of finance (Acemoglu and Johnson 2005; see also: Johnson et al. 
2002). Relational lending tends to dominate in finance, and that has a negative effect on 
provision of credit to small enterprises and start-ups (De la Torre et al. 2008). Based on 
what we have said, our first hypothesis is formulated as follows. 
 
H1: Weak property rights discourage financiers, both formal and informal, limiting 
a new entrepreneur’s use of external finance. They also diminish incentives for own 
investment, resulting in smaller individual start-up projects as measured by the size of 
finance used.  
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2.2 Financial Regulation and Financial Development 
 
 Along with a well-functioning property rights system, developed financial 
institutions have been argued to play an important role in enhancing the level of 
entrepreneurial activity (Aidis et al. 2008) and in firm’s growth (Beck 2005 et al.). 
Financial intermediaries facilitate the risk amelioration in the presence of problems 
created by information and transaction frictions, by developing expertise in risk 
assessment and in monitoring (Levine 1997; Barth et al. 2006; De la Torre et al. 2008). 
Parallel to this, the financial sector affects firm financing through the allocation of 
savings towards investment projects (Levine et al. 1999). Developed financial 
institutions are found to be particularly beneficial for small firms compared to large ones 
(Barth et al. 2006; Beck et al. 2005; 2008). The same should apply even more to start-
ups. Yet efficient and well developed financial sector is conditioned by appropriate 
financial regulation, which remains at the centre of policy-oriented economic debate. 
While it appears that regulatory focus on supporting transparency, on access to 
information and on enhancing market-based monitoring has been clearly beneficial, the 
scope of financial restrictions and the scope and discretion of the direct supervisory 
oversight is a more controversial issue, with emerging empirical evidence of some 
negative effects, including both lower financial efficiency and higher likelihood of 
financial crises. These negative effects may be seen as either unintended (public 
interest view) or as a by-product of regulatory capture by special interests within the 
financial sector (venal corruption) and/or by political interests imposed from above 
(systemic corruption) (Barth et al. 2006; 2008). 
  Consistent with this, Jappeli and Pagano (1994) argue that heterogeneity in 
liquidity constraints across countries is largely attributed to the regulation of the financial 
sector.  Excessive financial restrictions are likely to lead to financial disintermediation 
(Korosteleva and Lawson 2010). This may have further adverse consequences for new 
firms. Burdensome financial regulation is seen to be inefficient, empowering 
governmental officials, fuelling corruption and benefiting incumbent firms (Barth et al. 
2008). Typically, it is also associated with growing share of direct state majority 
ownership of banks. State banks are likely to prioritise state owned firms and 
discriminate against entrepreneurs in their lending policies (De la Torre et al. 2008). 
Consequently, our next hypothesis is formulated as follows:  
 
H2: Extensive financial restrictions reflecting conditions of financial repression 
have negative effects on the use of external finance and on the total volume of start-up 
finance. 
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Informal finance comprised of family and friends’ funds and investment of private 
business angels is also important for start-ups. In their study of nascent entrepreneurs 
in the USA, Campbell and De Nardi (2007) show that informal finance, primarily from 
friends and family, is the second largest source of start-up financing after own funds.  
Informal finance is often seen as substitute for formal finance when the latter is 
unattainable (Allen, Quian and Quian 2005), although the informal sector may also be 
the sector of choice, given that informal loans, in particular from friends or relatives may 
be cheaper (Guirkinger 2008). Reliance on informal funds may also be typical for 
entrepreneurs in developing countries, with a number of them preferring to stay in the 
shadow economy, which typically implies small size (Straub 2005; Batra 2003). 
Empirical evidence suggests that informal finance does not perfectly substitute for 
formal finance as it fails to scale up (Ayyagari et al. 2008; Estrin et al. 2009; Du and 
Girma 2009). Accordingly, it is unlikely that informal finance can lead to projects 
characterised by larger-scale, if not enhanced by efficient regulatory environment, which 
creates incentives for both savings and larger-scale investment.  
At the same time, informal finance may be seen as more than just an endogenous 
response to the prevailing setup of formal institutions: its role is also supported by 
strong incentives embedded at the level of long-lasting cultural values and social 
attitudes. It is one possible way to explain an important role informal finance plays in 
Far-East Asia (Smallbone and Jianzhong, 2008). Here we posit that informal finance 
plays an independent albeit limited role in start-up finance and posit our next 
hypothesis.  
 
H3: The size of the informal financial sector is of significant importance to 
entrepreneurs in increasing the likelihood of the use of external funding at time of entry, 
but may have no significant positive effect on the financial scale of their project. 
 
Similarly to informal finance, international financial flows may be seen as only 
partially correlated with the local regulatory and legal environment. In general, both 
strong local property rights and local financial liberalisation will enhance international 
financial flows. From this point of view, the joint impact of these three factors could be 
difficult to disentangle. At the same time, however, international flows of finance may 
partly substitute for the weaknesses of local environment, which is the main intuition 
offered by Tornell and Westermann (2005). While prior research typically assumes that 
the entrepreneurial sector would benefit least from increased external openness 
compared with large firms (e.g. Giannetti and Ongena 2005), Tornell and Westermann 
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(2005) argue the contrary. The key point here is that typically large firms have always 
better access to international financial markets, either directly via stock exchanges or 
indirectly via financing from foreign owners. This implies that the differential effect of 
wider external financial openness is stronger on small firms. This impact needs not to 
come in a form of direct loans from abroad, but may operate via the intermediation of 
the domestic banking sector, enhancing availability of credit. Accordingly, even under 
weak property rights and/or restricted domestic finance, the larger players may still 
benefit from reputational capital, which would substitute for effective external protection 
of the financial contract and would facilitate access to direct funding from abroad; they 
may also form relational capital with large banks (typically government controlled) 
extracting rents in the form of privileged access to credit. In turn, this implies that the 
small firms will benefit relatively more from the appearance of new external sources of 
finance, either direct (say, in a form of remittances or loans from foreign banks) or 
indirect (say, via enhancing domestic supply of credit based on foreign sources of 
finance that may result in lower cost of capital; also via increasing competition in the 
domestic financial sector). According to Alfaro and Charlton (2007), financial integration 
particularly benefits entrepreneurship more reliant on external finance due to the size 
requirements. However, financial integration also implies that this group of users of 
finance will be more sensitive to reversals in cross-border financial flows.  
Accordingly, we hypothesise: 
 
H4: Cross border capital flows have significant impact on start-up finance, 
including both its total amount and the use of external funding.  
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2.3 Controls: Entrepreneurial Traits and Start-up Characteristics 
 
Existing empirical studies focus on firm-specific characteristics including 
ownership structure, growth aspirations, and owners’ characteristics as key factors 
determining start-up finance. The important role of entrepreneurial personal traits, 
attitude to risk, motivation and cognition have been advocated to explain entrepreneurial 
entry, decision-making and survival (Parker 2004; Arenius and Minniti 2005; Aidis et al. 
2007; Aidis et al. 2008; Ardagna and Lusardi 2008). More specifically, such socio-
demographic features of entrepreneurs as age, gender, work status and social capital 
are shown to be significant determinants of entrepreneurial entry (Aldrich et al 1987; 
Coleman 2000; Johanisson 2000; Minniti et al. 2005; Levesque and Minniti 2006, Aidis 
et al. 2010).  
In our models we include socio-economic characteristics of entrepreneurs (age, 
gender, employment status, education, current ownership of another business, acting as 
business angel in the past, knowing other entrepreneurs) and personal cognitive 
features (opportunity motivation in particular).  
In particular, previous research indicates that entrepreneurs’ financial decision-
making (in particular capital purchases) is a quadratic function of the entrepreneur’s age 
(Holtz-Eakin et al. 1994).  We introduce age squared to test this. We also expect being 
male and having current work experience to be positively associated with the total 
financial size of the project and the use of external funds.  
Modern entrepreneurship theory emphasizes the importance of self-efficacy of 
individuals for entering entrepreneurship. Self-efficacy may be enhanced through social 
learning (Harper 2003).  Being embedded in various business networks is one example 
of how this may occur (Minniti et al. 2005). Previous studies show that social networks 
facilitate entrepreneurs’ access to finance (Aldrich et al 1987; Johanisson 2003). 
Respectively, we also expect social capital to be positively associated with the overall 
size of the project and to enhance entrepreneurs’ reliance on external funds. 
Start-ups driven by perceptions of opportunities (as contrasted with necessity 
motive), may appear as more attractive to external financiers, not just because of the 
higher expected returns, but also because the modern banking sector derives its start-
ups related profits not just (and not primarily) from direct lending, but also from offering 
a wider range of financial services, including servicing personal accounts of prospective 
employees of a new business (De la Torre et al. 2008). Thus, profit opportunities for the 
providers of finance are closely related to the expected size of a new project and new 
entry being driven by perception of opportunity is a good predictor of this.  
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 Finally, we also expect start-up ownership structure to affect both the 
entrepreneurs’ access to external finance and the overall size of entrepreneurial project. 
We include the variable that identifies start-ups with more than one owner. A positive 
effect of having business partners at the time of the start-up (resource-based view) may 
be similar to the network effect discussed above: additional business partners enhance 
network capital of the new venture. 
 While these are our main control variables at the individual level, in our study we 
also introduce controls at macro level as discussed below. 
  
2.4 Control variables at the macro level 
 
We control for the stage of economic development and business cycles by 
introducing per capita GDP (at purchasing power parity) and annual rate of economic 
growth (Carree et al. 2002, Wennekers et al. 2005). As far as start-up financing is 
concerned, our prior expectation has been to find a positive relationship between per 
capita GDP and the use of external finance as well as with the overall financial size of 
the project.   
We introduced the GDP annual growth rate to reflect cyclicality in economic 
performance.  We expect that at the period of recession, when the financial sector 
contracts, entrepreneurs rely more on their own funds or on informal investments from 
their family and friends. Furthermore, a project is more likely to be small in scale.  
 We also introduce an indicator of government size. Both entrepreneurial entry in 
general and entrepreneurial financial decisions specifically may be affected by welfare 
provision and higher tax burden, which increase opportunity cost and decrease 
expected returns to entrepreneurial activity respectively (Aidis et al. 2010). 
 
The next section describes our data and methodology.  
 
3. Data and Methodology  
 
3.1 Sample 
 
To explore the determinants of the financial structure of business start-ups, we 
use the data collected through the GEM adult population surveys in 2001-2006, 
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covering 54 countries worldwide1. The data consists of representative samples of at 
least 2,000 individuals in each country, drawn from the working age population. GEM 
surveys were completed through phone calls and through face-to-face interviews in 
countries, where low density of the telephone network could create a bias. National 
datasets are harmonised across these countries (Reynolds et al. 2005).  
GEM data distinguishes between (i) people with the intention to start a business, 
(ii) nascent entrepreneurs (who are already in a process of establishing a new firm, also 
labelled start-ups) and (iii) currently operating young firms (under three and a half 
years). For the purpose of this study we will focus on start-ups. This is a category, 
where initial entrepreneurial financing decisions may be captured best, without being 
affected by a subsequent development of individual businesses. Start-ups or nascent 
entrepreneurs are, according to GEM criteria, defined as individuals between 18-64 
years old, showing some action towards setting up a new business whether fully or 
partly owned. They also must not yet have paid any wages or salaries for more than 
three months. Altogether, start-ups (or nascent entrepreneurs), young firms under three 
and a half years and established businesses account for 3.66, 2.8 and 6.85 per cent of 
the whole GEM dataset respectively.  
GEM dataset provides unique information on start-up characteristics such as 
ownership structure, informal finance and entrepreneurs’ personal characteristics, 
ranging from standard socio-economic characteristics to more specific entrepreneurial 
traits allowing us to draw additional inferences consistent with section 2.3 above. The 
following sub-section discusses variable definitions and measurements in more detail. 
 
3.2 Variables: Definitions and Measurement 
 
There is no universally accepted set of measures of institutional quality. In their 
majority researchers have used what is commonly referred to as institutional outcome 
variables (Glaeser et al. 2004). The commonly used measures include Polity IV 
(Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions) indicators and survey indicators 
provided by the International Country Risk Guide, those provided by the World Bank 
Governance project; the World Bank’s Doing Business survey; and the Heritage 
Foundation – Wall Street Journal “Economic Freedom” database. In reality, there is a 
continuum between the long-term stable institutional arrangements and short-term 
                                                 
1 The original dataset covers 55 countries. However some observations, including all 
observations on Venezuela, were dropped from the sample as extreme outliers, as we suspected 
a serious country-specific measurement error on start-up finance (for further discussion see the 
text). Countries included in the sample are those presented at Figures 1-3.  
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government policies, and delimiting the two in an exact way is conceptually difficult 
(Glaeser et al. 2004). The expectations of the economic actors about durability of given 
policies, laws on books and administrative practice play a critical role, and identifying a 
priori the empirical characteristics of institutional and policy setup conducive to 
economic development and entrepreneurship is not easy.  
As argued in Section 2, we take property rights as the key component of the 
institutional setup representing ‘higher order’ institutions (Williamson, 2000). We follow 
Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) who argue that the measure of effective constraints 
imposed on the executive branch of the government, (which is reported by the Polity IV 
project: <<http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm>>), is superior to other 
widely used indicators.  
In our focus on formal finance we face a problem of very high correlation between 
the ratio of domestic credit to private sector to GDP taken as a measure of the size of 
the formal financial sector, and our key control variable, which is GDP per capita, even if 
domestic credit has been used in previous studies on entrepreneurship (Klapper et al. 
2006; Beck et al. 2008). We see no good solution to this problem as this high level of 
correlation translates into lack of robustness and sensitivity to specifications. As a result, 
we narrow our focus, concentrating on measures of financial regulation and financial 
openness, which do not lead to such problems.  Accordingly, to measure the extent of 
financial restrictions we use the indicator of financial freedom from the Heritage 
Foundation database. The financial freedom index measures the extent of restrictions 
imposed on financial activities (with reverse sign), i.e. the state intervention in the 
national financial system, which goes beyond the prudential supervision and 
informational, transparency and audit requirements. Low values of the financial freedom 
index indicate direct state influence on the allocation of finance, including state 
ownership of financial institutions (Beach and Kane 2008).  
Along with the financial regulation measure we introduce proxies for financial 
globalisation to test our Hypothesis 4. These measures include loans from non-resident 
banks, offshore deposits as a proportion of domestic deposits and remittances inflow 
relative to GDP. They were obtained from the World Bank ‘Financial Structure’ dataset 
(2008, version 4).   
We introduce the prevalence rate of informal investors, which proxies for the 
availability of informal funds that can be used for an individual start-up capital. It is 
derived from our GEM data by taking the average percentage of respondents who 
invested in someone else’s start-up in the past three years in each country-year sub-
sample (Reynolds et al. 2005; Bygrave and Reynolds 2004).  
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Our government size indicator is proxied by a measure of government expenses 
in relation to GDP taken from World Bank WDI database. Alternatively, we also utilize 
an alternative measure of government size obtained from Heritage Foundation – Wall 
Street Journal, which is simply based on the cubic transformation of the same 
government expense measure as reported by World Bank (and comes with a reverse 
sign), but has an advantage of a wider coverage.   
Finally, we use the individual-level GEM-defined variables to represent network 
capital, business ownership and opportunity motive. We aim to capture social network 
effects by introducing a dummy variable which shows if the respondent knows some 
other entrepreneurs.  In addition, we introduce a dummy representing a current owner of 
any other existing businesses. This captures both network effects and individual 
entrepreneurial experience (Wennekers’s et. al. 2005). To examine the effects of the 
ownership structure variable we use a dummy that identifies start-ups with more than 
one owner. Finally, to measure an opportunity motivation we introduce a dummy 
variable equal to one if launching a start-up is driven by a respondent recognising an 
opportunity (as contrasted with the necessity motive) (see Table 1). 
As our dependent, we look at the volume of individual start-up finance, including: 
the total amount of finance, the amount of own finance, and of external finance. The 
volume of own finance is calculated as the difference between total and external finance 
as reported by the respondents. We take the original GEM data expressed in local 
currencies and scale it by dividing by the nominal per capita GDP (in local currency), to 
get cross-country compatible data. We also experimented with relying on total volume of 
finance expressed in constant US dollars, but these exercises are less revealing, as 
most of the variation is explained by GDP per capita. We believe that the size of start-up 
scaled by GDP per capita produces an indicator that is a good comparative measure of 
the economic significance of an individual project.   
For further details regarding definitions and descriptive statistics of dependent 
variables, as well as the correlation matrix for institutional and macroeconomic variables 
see respectively Tables 1 and 2. 
 
{Tables 1-2 about here}  
 
3.3 Methodology 
 
We use OLS regression augmented with country-years effects as our main 
estimator for the volume of finance, and apply a binary-outcome selection estimator that 
does not rely on excluding restrictions for the indicator variable for the use of external 
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finance. Initially, we considered applying the Heckman selection model (known also as 
Tobit II model) instead. However, a problem we encountered using a Heckman model 
was multicollinearity, due to the identification problem caused by the use of identical or 
nearly identical variables to estimate both selection and outcome equations. In this case 
identification proceeds only on the basis of distributional assumptions about the 
residuals alone and not due to variation in the explanatory variables (Sartori 2003). To 
overcome this problem one should impose exclusion restrictions. Yet the choice of a 
variable for that is challenging and difficult to justify theoretically. In our experiments with 
Heckman model, we used business constraints (from Heritage Foundation) as an 
identification variable, assuming that business constraints are sunk costs that 
theoretically should only matter entrepreneurial entry decision but should not have any 
significant effects on a start-up financial decision. However, insignificance of Mill’s ratio, 
which is the specific parameter of a Heckman specification, most likely indicated the 
problem of misspecification of either selection or outcome models. To solve this problem 
we applied an alternative estimator of the selection model which does not require 
imposing excluding restrictions, but makes use of an additional piece of information 
which allows assuming that error terms for two equations are identical for each 
observation (see Sartori 2003 for further discussion). Respectively, we define our 
selection and outcome choices as follows: 
10 =iy    if 01 =z , 0 otherwise  
11 =iy    if 11 =z and 02 =z  
12 =iy   if 11 =z and 12 =z .  
 
Here, z1 indicates entrepreneurial entry decision and z2 relates to the use of 
external funding. Thus, 0iy  has value of 1 if a respondent does not enter 
entrepreneurship; 1iy has value of 1 if a respondent enters entrepreneurship but does 
not rely on external funding; and 2iy has value of 1 if an individual enters 
entrepreneurship and relies on the use of external funding in financing a start-up.  The 
model is estimated by using a maximum likelihood method.  
However, while implementing the model, we discovered that it does not 
converge when the full set of country and time individual effects is used to control for 
unobserved heterogeneity. Therefore, we estimated the model without controlling for 
country and time effects, but declare the limitation. 
In turn, this problem is overcome when we apply the one-stage regression 
model. Regression models converged even as we used the full set of country-years 
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individual effects. Using a larger set of country-years effect instead of two sets of 
country effects and time effects has been our preferred option, as we want to capture 
not just unobserved (constant) cross-country heterogeneity but also account for 
measurement errors specific to each country-year sub-sample. 
To summarize we face the following trade-off in our estimation strategy. We can 
either apply selection models without country-year effects but based on the full sample 
information (i.e. controlling for entry decision), or rely on the one stage OLS estimator 
while controlling for a full set of country-year effects but not for the first stage selection. 
We report both and there is sufficient consistency between the two set of results to have 
some confidence in findings. 
 
3.4 Robustness 
 
In this study we also encountered a serious problem with outliers in the finance 
variables related to country-years samples. We investigated the data by aggregating the 
individual volume of start-up finance as country-year sub-sample level medians. For a 
small number of country-years samples the observations are clearly not in a plausible 
range, with some extreme cases, where medians are shifted compared with other 
countries by a factor of more than one hundred. To alleviate this problem we looked 
more closely into the distributions of country-year subsamples medians and eliminated 
few country-year subsamples, where the finance medians were severe outliers as 
defined by being outside the outer fence (defined by interquartile range multiplied by 
three). As a result, the following country year subsamples were excluded from 
subsequent analysis: Belgium 2003, Iceland 2004, Italy 2002, Slovenia 2003-2006, 
Venezuela 2003-2005. 
A different problem relates to trade-offs between using more precise measures 
and increasing missingness in data. In particular, the problem relates to the World Bank 
measure of government size versus an alternative but less precise measure of 
government size obtained from the Heritage Foundation (which has better coverage). 
We tested the impact of missingness by introducing a dummy which codes all 
observations used in the regression with the World Bank measure of government size 
(as in Table 3, specification 1 below) and inserting it into specifications analogous to 5-6 
in Table 3, which rely on the Heritage Foundation proxy for government size. Along with 
this dummy we also introduced an interaction term between the dummy and a property 
rights measure. The interaction term has been significant. The outcome of this exercise 
suggest that insignificance of results for property rights we record for specifications with 
World Bank government size measure is driven by reduction in sample size.         
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In the next section we discuss our empirical results. 
 
4. Empirical Results 
 
4.1. Correlations based on country-level medians 
 
We start our discussion by examining cross-country variation in the amount of 
total start-up finance and own funds in relation to the stages of economic development, 
business cycle and cross-border financial flows (share of offshore deposits), see 
Figures 1-3 below.  
Figure 1 shows the country-level median (data pooled over time) of the amount of 
total finance for start-up (USD) plotted against the level of economic development. Not 
surprisingly, a number of lower income countries demonstrate low levels of the financial 
scale of the project (e.g. Uganda). As GDP pc increases reflecting greater financing 
opportunities, so does the size of the project (e.g. Latvia, Croatia, Czech Republic, 
Portugal in the middle range). However, with a certain point of the economic 
development, we discover the relationship to be heteroscedastic: start-ups in the 
developed countries find themselves positioned within a wide range of project size 
values, spread from cases like United Arab Emirates with very high median size of the 
project to Norway, with very little finance associated with any new start-up. Very similar 
pattern is confirmed when we focus on the volume of own financial investment instead 
of total finance. 
In turn, Figure 2 illustrates the importance of international financial flows for the 
median financial size of a start-up as captured at country level. The correlation between 
the two is negative and is primarily driven by some Latin American countries that seem 
to experience capital flight combined with lack of new entrepreneurial projects of a 
larger financial size (Argentina, Columbia, Uruguay). Amongst the comparator middle 
income countries, South Korea is located at the opposite side of the spectrum. 
Finally, we move to our preferred measure of start-up finance that is the nominal 
amount scaled by nominal GDP per capita, which indicates the comparable economic 
importance of a start-up project. The country level medians are pitched against another 
variable of interest, which is GDP growth (Figure 3). We find few Asian economies 
located as outliers within the upper right hand side section of the graph above the least 
squared line (China, Korea, Taiwan, United Arab Republic, Jordan, India, Thailand). 
These are the countries characterised by above average rates of economic growth and 
by sizeable start-up projects. It is consistent with the fact that saving rates in Asia are 
high and while much of the development is driven by foreign capital, domestic 
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entrepreneurship plays equally important role. In contrast, all Latin American countries 
in our sample are located below the least squared line. This suggests that much less of 
the economic growth is associated with new entry based on significant amount of 
finance. Entry – while widespread - remains constrained in terms of average economic 
size. Comparing Figure 3 with Figure 2 we notice that on top of the fact that those 
countries generate less domestic savings, it is also that some of these savings clearly 
flow abroad instead of being invested within. 
 
4.2 Estimation results based on individual data 
 
We report out results in Tables 3-4 (Regression models) and Table 5 (Selection 
models). Model 1 in Table 3 is our benchmark specification for the total volume of 
finance. In specifications 2-4, we replace the indicator of financial freedom with our 
proxies for internationalisation of finance (loans from non-resident banks, share of off-
shore deposits, remittance inflows). Specifications 5 and 6 correspond to models 2 and 
3, but with Heritage Foundation measure of government size replacing the World Bank 
measure of government expenses over GDP. This enables us to use more 
observations. Table 4 reports specifications based on the same set of explanatory 
variables as for Table 3 (models 1, 3, 4), but now with the volume of external finance 
taken as the dependent variable. Next we present the same specifications but for the 
amount of own finance. Finally, in Table 5 we report similar models but now using 
selection models without exclusion restrictions.  
We find partial support for our Hypothesis 1. The results are sensitive to a sample 
size. When the larger sample is used (as in models 5 and 6 in Table 3), the property 
rights indicator is significant. However, it is not significant in other specifications for the 
volume of finance that use more restricted sample (see section 3.4). In turn, it becomes 
highly significant for the likelihood of the use of external finance, when the selection 
model is used (Table 5), but here we do not control for country-level unobserved 
heterogeneity. Thus we find some evidence suggesting that strong protection of 
property rights is conducive to the larger overall volume of start-up finance.  
 We confirm our Hypothesis 2. Financial liberalisation has significant positive 
impact on the average total volume of start-up finance (model 1 in Table 3), on the 
average volume of own finance (Table 4 model 4) and on the average volume of 
external finance (Table 4 model 1) as well as on the likelihood of the use of external 
finance (Table 5, model 1). The results indicate that financial liberalisation not only 
increases the volume of external finance used by entrepreneurs but also provides more 
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opportunities for (potential) entrepreneurs to accumulate savings to be subsequently 
used for business formation. 
We find some support for our Hypothesis 3. Prevalence of informal finance seems 
to be a good predictor of the use of external finance by an entrepreneur (selection 
models 1-3 in Table 5). However it has no impact on the volume of finance, as 
expected. Taken together, the results could suggest that informal finance plays some 
important role enabling new entrepreneurs to access finance, but the size of these 
injections are limited. Larger financial projects are supported by formal finance, which in 
turn, consistent with our Hypothesis 2 is unlikely to play a role in entrepreneurial finance 
under the repressed financial systems.  
Last but not least, we see support for our Hypothesis 4 based on three alternative 
proxies for the internationalisation of finance. First, loans from non-resident banks are 
associated with larger size of the average volume of finance for start-up (based on 
specification 2 in Table 3) and also with the likelihood of use of external finance (the 
outcome of the selection model, Table 5, model 2). However, as verified by correlation 
matrix, this variable is relatively highly correlated with GDP per capita, and this is 
probably a reason why the variable becomes insignificant in specification 5 of Table 3 
and why the models for the volume of own finance and for external finance (based on a 
smaller number of observations while keeping full set of country-year effects) could not 
converge (and therefore are not reported). 
Similarly, inflow of remittances from abroad is associated with higher volume of 
finance (Table 3, model 4) and with higher volume of own finance (Table 4, model 6), 
but not with the use of external finance (Table 4, model 3). This is consistent with our 
expectations, as it indicates that remittances are mostly used in entrepreneurial finance 
directly via private channels leading to larger average volume of own finance. Their 
impact on external entrepreneurial finance via banking channels seems to be less 
significant. 
Finally, larger share of offshore deposits is significantly and negatively associated 
with the volume of total finance, of own finance, and of external finance. This illustrates 
that financial internationalisation may result both in inflows supporting entrepreneurship, 
but also in outflows that would work against it. The latter may be related to two different 
issues. It may either indicate a situation of a country where investment opportunities are 
decreasing when the economy reaches some level of development (Ireland on Figure 2) 
or countries where weak institutions create incentives for capital flight (several Latin 
American countries on Figure 2).  
Our other results suggest that entrepreneurs’ socio-economic characteristics, such 
as age, gender and education emerge as significant predictors of the overall financial 
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scale of the project. Age exhibits a non-linear relationship with the size of the project, 
suggesting that while very young entrepreneurs are less likely to launch financially 
ambitious projects, the financial scale of the project increases with age, perhaps 
reflecting better access to resources and more confidence based on accumulated 
experience and knowledge of own skills. By that time the entrepreneurs are also likely to 
have some established reputation that may ease up their access to credit matching the 
use of own funds. However, beyond a certain age point the sign reverses with old 
entrepreneurs launching less sizable projects, perhaps due to shorter time horizon and 
changes in attitudes towards risk (Table 3).  
Interestingly, the pattern becomes different once we disaggregate total finance.   
While the results of Table 5 consistently suggest non-monotonicity between age 
and the use of external financing, with respect to the volume of external funding used for 
a start-up, only the linear term is significant, indicating that age exhibits a positive 
monotone relationship with the amount of external finance used. On the other hand, age 
appears insignificant in predicting the amount of own funds (see Table 4).   
Males are more likely to launch financially ambitious projects, to use external 
finance, to acquire more external funds and to invest more of their own funds. This 
finding extends previous studies of the role of gender (e.g. Minitti et al. 2005).  
Post-secondary and higher education appear to matter for the financial scale of 
the project, but their effects become insignificant for the amount of external and internal 
funds of start-up, possibly because a large proportion of observations is lost as 
disaggregated information is not always available. Here, our results on personal 
characteristics contrast to some extent with Cassar’s (2003) findings, which suggest that 
experience and higher education don’t exert a significant effect upon start-up financing.  
An opportunity motive, being a business angel in the past and a presence of 
additional business partners (co-owners) appear to be strongly and positively 
associated with the overall financial size of the project and the amount of external 
finance for start-ups. Interestingly, knowing other entrepreneurs play no role in own 
finance, but becomes a significant factor affecting the volume of external finance.  
Our macroeconomic control variables are all significant in the selection model on 
determinants of use of external finance (Table 5). Namely, size of government comes 
with negative sign; being located in a post-Communist economy has a negative impact 
and use of external finance is less likely in rich countries. The latter effect becomes 
more intuitive once we notice from Table 4 that level of development is positively 
associated with the amount of own finance invested, albeit the result oscillates between 
marginally significant and marginally insignificant. Similarly, while GDP growth has a 
negative impact on likelihood of use of external finance, it is positively associated with 
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the total volume used for the individual start-up, albeit again the result becomes 
insignificant once the sample size is reduced (Table 3, specifications 1-4 versus 5-6).  
 
5. Conclusions 
 
Our findings may be summarized as follows.  
First, consistent with the literature, it seems that strong protection of property 
rights system has positive impact determining the use of external finance and the 
financial size of the entrepreneurial project. However the latter result is sensitive to 
sample size and should be treated with caution.  
Second, we find that financial liberalisation seems to affect all aspects of start-up 
financing positively. It increases both the likelihood of the use of external finance and its 
volume in start-ups. It also creates ample opportunities for entrepreneurs to accumulate 
savings to be subsequently used for launching their own businesses. Both channels 
(external and internal) result in higher total financial size of the project. While financial 
liberalisation measure is correlated with the more fundamental dimension of property 
rights (the correlation coefficient is at 0.28), it may also play an autonomous role 
enhancing finance. As stressed by Tornell and Westermann (2005), if reform of the 
fundamental property rights and contracting frameworks “is not feasible, financial 
liberalisation may be a second best response” (ibid. p.19), and this is what we observe 
in many middle income countries. Our contribution is to demonstrate that liberalisation 
of finance supports not just the SME sector (as in Tornell and Westermann’s (2005) 
model) but also new entry associated with large-scale projects requiring adequate levels 
of financing. These are projects of economic significance that can be potentially seen as 
the micro drivers for economic development and growth.  
Third, our findings suggest that informal finance while facilitating start-ups’ access 
to external finance, does nothing to enhance large scale project. This implies that high-
growth oriented start-ups - that are typically associated with larger scale of finance - 
require more sophisticated institutions, including a well-developed financial system. 
Fourth, extending Tornell and Westermann’s (2005) argument, we find that start-
ups benefit not just from financial liberalisation, but also more specifically from financial 
openness. By focusing on some selected indicators of cross-border financial flows we 
investigated few channels through which financial openness enhances entrepreneurial 
finance. More specifically, we found that inflow of remittances is directly associated with 
larger volume of own finance, which in turn affects the total financial size of the start-up 
project as well. In contrast, loans from non-resident banks increase the likelihood of use 
of external finance, and again result in higher volume of overall start-up finance. And 
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finally the larger share of offshore deposits affects both external and own funding 
negatively and results in lower overall volume of finance. We see the latter as an 
important result: it demonstrates that while financial liberalisation and financial 
openness can bring some positive results, these may remain limited without deeper 
institutional reforms establishing rule of law and credible protection of assets and 
contracts. What we observe in countries like Argentina, Columbia or Uruguay (Figure 3) 
is that with weak institutions, openness leads to capital flight and new entrepreneurial 
ventures are limited in size of investment. Thus, while we conclude that financial 
liberalisation and globalisation seem to be supporting entrepreneurship, its positive 
impact is constrained for nations that are unable to arrive at some stable, sustainable 
institutional frameworks that limit systemic risk of policy reversals and of arbitrary 
interventions, encouraging individual investment and entrepreneurship. In this our 
findings are consistent with the argument developed by Philippon and Véron (2008) 
suggesting that improvement in legal and regulatory environment leading to 
augmentation of the domestic financial system could be more beneficial for facilitating 
financing of emerging firms with high-growth potential, compared with any direct 
subsidies or intervention. 
 
References: 
Acemoglu, D. and S. Johnson, Unbundling Institutions, Journal of Political Economy, 
113, 2005: 943-995. 
Aidis, R., S. Estrin and T. Mickiewicz, Institutions and Entrepreneurship Development 
in Russia: A Comparative Perspective, Journal of Business Venturing, 23(6), 2008:656-
672.    
Aidis, R., S. Estrin and T. Mickiewicz, Size matters: entrepreneurial entry and 
government. Small Business Economics. DOI 10.1007/s11187-010-9299-y, 2010. 
Aldrich, H., B. Rosen and W. Woodward, The Impact of Social Networks on Business 
Funding and Profit. Frontiers of Entrepreneurship Research. Wellesley, MA: Babson 
College, 1987. 
Alfaro, L. and A. Charlton, International Financial Integration and Entrepreneurial 
Firm Activity, NBER Workign Paper Series, 13118, 2007.  
Allen, F., J. Qian and M. Qian, Law, finance, and economic growth in China. Journal 
of Financial Economics, 77, 2005: 57-116. 
Ardagna, S. and A. Lusardi, Explaining International Differences in Entrepreneurship: 
the Role of Individual Characteristics and Regulatory Constraints. NBER Working 
Paper, 14012, 2008. 
Arenius, P. and M. Minniti, Perceptual Variables and Nascent Entrepreneurship. 
Small Business Economics, 24, 2005: 233-247. 
Ayyagari, M. A. Demirguc-Kunt and V. Maksimovic 2008. Formal versus Informal 
Finance: Evidence from China, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4465. 
Barth, J., G. Caprio, and R. Levine, Rethinking Bank Regulation. Till Angels Govern. 
Cambridge: CUP, 2006. 
Barth, J., G. Caprio, and R. Levine, Bank Regulations Are Changing: For Better or 
Worse? Working Paper Series, 4646, World Bank: Washington D.C., 2008. 
 
 
21 
 
Batra, G., Kaufmann, D., Stone, A., Investment climate around the world: voices of 
the firms from the world business environment survey, World Bank Report 26103, 2003, 
Washington, DC. 
Baumol, W., Entrepreneurship: Productive, Unproductive, and Destructive, Journal of 
Political Economy, 98 (5, Part I), 1990: 893-921. 
Beach, W. and T. Kane, Methodology: Measuring the 10 Economic Freedoms. In 
Holmes, K., E., Feulner, and M. O’Grady, eds., 2008 Index of Economic Freedom. The 
Heritage Foundation: Washington, D.C., 2008:39-55. 
Beck, T., A., Demirgüç-Kunt and V. Maksimovic, Financial and Legal Constraints to 
Growth: Does the Firm Size Matter? The Journal of Finance, Vol. LX (1), 2005.  
Beck, T., A. Demirgüç-Kunt and V. Maksimovic, Financial Patterns Around the World: 
Are Small Firms Different? Journal of Financial Economics, 89(3), 2008: 467-487. 
Bygrave, W. D. and P. D. Reynolds, Who finances startups in the USA? A 
comprehensive study of informal investors, 1998–2003. Frontiers of Entrepreneurship 
Research: 2004. Babson Park, MA: Babson College, 2004. 
Campbell, J. and M. De Nardi, A Conversation with 590 Nascent Entrepreneurs, Annalis 
of Finance, 5, 2009. 
Carree, M., Van Stel, R. Thurik and S. Wennekers, Economic Development and 
Business Ownership: An Analysis Using Data of 23 OECD Countries in the Period 
1976-1996, Small Business Economics, 19, 2002:271-290. 
Cassar, G., The Financing of Business Start-ups. Journal of Business Venturing, 19, 
2003: 261-283.  
Coleman, S., Access to Capital and Terms of Credit: a Comparison of Men- and 
Women-Owned Small Businesses, Journal of Small Business Management, 38(3), 
2000: 37-52.   
De La Torre, A.M. Peria and S. Schmukler, Bank Involvement with SMEs: Beyond 
Relationship Lending, Working Paper Series, 4649. World Bank: Washington, D.C., 
2008.    
Du J. and S. Girma, Finance and Firm Start-up Size: Quantile Regression Evidence 
from China. University of Nottingham Research Paper, 2009, 12. 
Estrin, S., J. Korostelva and T Mickiewicz 2009. Better Means More: Property Rights 
and High-Growth Aspiration Entrepreneurship, IZA Discussion Paper, 2009, 4396.   
Giannetti, M. And S. Ongena, Financial Integration and Entrepreneurial Activity: 
Evidence from Foreign Bank Entry in Emerging Markets, European Central Bank 
Working Paper Series, 498, 2005.  
Glaeser, E., R., La Porta, F., Lopez-de-Silanes and A. Shleifer, Do Institutions Cause 
Growth? NBER Working Paper Series, 10568, 2004.  
Guirkinger, C.,Understanding the Coexistence of Formal and Informal Credit Markets 
in Piura, Peru, World Development, 36(8), 2008: 1436-1452. 
Harper, D., Foundations of Entrepreneurship and Economic Development. Abingdon: 
Routledge, 2003. 
Harris, M. and A. Raviv, The Theory of Capital Structure, Journal of Finance, 46(1), 
1991: 297-355. 
Ho, Y. and P. Wong, Financing, Regulatory Cost and Entrepreneurial Propensity, 
Small Business Economics, 28, 2007:187-204.  
Holtz-Eakin, D., D. Joulfaian and H. Rosen, Sticking it Out: Entrepreneurial Survival 
and Liquidity Constraints, Journal of Political Economy, 102, 1994:53-75. 
Huyghebaert, N. and L. Van de Gucht, The Determinants of Financial Structure: New 
Insights from Business Start-ups. European Financial Management, 13(1), 2007:101-
133. 
Jappelli, T. and M. Pagano, Saving, Growth, and Liquidity Constraints. The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 109(1), 1994: 83-109.  
Jonhanisson, B., Networking and Entrepreneurial Growth. In D. Sexton and H. 
Lawrence, eds., The Blackwell Handbook of Entrepreneurship. Blackwell: Oxford, 2000: 
368-386.   
 
 
22 
 
Johnson, S., J. McMillan and C. Woodruff, Property Rights and Finance, The 
American Economic Review, 92 (5), 2002:1335-1356.  
Korosteleva, J. and C. Lawson, The Belarusian Case of Transition: Whither Financial 
Repression? Post-Communist Economies, vol. 22 (1),  2010. 
Klapper, L., L. Laeven, and R. Rajan, Entry Regulation as a Barrier to 
Entrepreneurship. Journal of Financial Economics, 82, 2006: 591-629.  
Lévesque, M. and M. Minniti, The Effect of Aging on Entrepreneurial Behaviour, 
Journal of Business Venturing, 21(2), 2006:177-194. 
Levine, R., Financial Development and Economic Growth: Views and Agenda, 
Journal of Economic Literature, 35 (June), 1997: 688-726. 
Levine, R., N. Loayza and T. Beck, Financial Intermediation and Growth, Policy 
Research Working Papers, 2059. Washington D.C.: World Bank, 1999.  
Minniti, M., W. Bygrave and E. Autio, Global Entrepreneurship Monitor: 2005 
Executive Report. Wellesley, MA: Babson College, 2005.  
OECD, The SME Financing Gap: Theory and Evidence, OECD Publishing, Vol. 1, 
2006.  
Parker, S., Evasion of Borrowing Constraints and Small Business Entry and Exit. 
Small Business Economics, 15, 2000: 223-32. 
Parker, S., The Economics of Self-employment and Entrepreneurship, Cambridge 
University Press: Cambridge, 2004. 
Philippon,T. and N. Véron, Financing Europe’s Fast Movers, Bruegel Policy Brief, 1, 
2008. 
Reynolds, P., N., Bosma, E. Autio, S. Hunt, N. De Bono, A. Servais, P. Lopez-Garcia 
and N. Chin, Global Entrepreneurship Monitor: Data Collection Design and 
Implementation 1998-2003. Small Business Economics, 24, 2005:205-231.    
Sartori, A., An Estimation for Some Binary-Outcome Selection Models Without 
Exclusion Restrictions, Political Analysis, (11) 2003: 111-138. 
Smallbone, D. and X. Jianzhong, Entrepreneurship and SME Development in The 
People’s Republic of China. In Dana, L., ed., Handbook of Research and 
Entrepreneurship in Asia. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2008. 
Storey, D., Understanding the Small Business Sector. New York: Routledge, 1994. 
Straub, S., Informal Sector: The Credit Market Channel, Journal of Development 
Economics, 78, 2005:299-321.  
Tornell, A. and F. Westermann, 2005. Boom-Bust Cycles and Financial 
Liberalization. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Van Stel, A., D. Storey and R. Thurik, The Effect of Business Regulations on Nascent 
and Young Business Entrepreneurship. Small Business Economics, 28, 2007:171-186. 
Verbeek, M. 2000. A Guide to Modern Econometrics. John Wiley & Sons: New York.  
Webb, D. and D. de Meza, Saving Eliminates Credit Rationing. FMG Discussion Paper, 
391. Financial Markets Group, LSE, 2001.  
Wennekers, A., A. Van Stel, A. Thurik and P. Reynolds, Nascent Entrepreneurship 
and Economic Development. Small Business Economics, 24, 2005:293-309. 
Williamson, O., New Institutional Economics, Journal of Economic Literature, 38, 
2000:595-613. 
 
 
23 
 
 Table 1: Descriptive statistics and definitions of explanatory variables 
 
Variable Definition Mean S.D. No of obs 
 
Business environment, financial globalisation variables and macroeconomic controls: 
Property rights Polity IV ‘Executive Constraints’; scores from 
1=”unlimited authority” to 7=”executive parity”; 
higher value denotes less arbitrariness 
6.49 
(6.72) 
1.27 
(.94) 
17,58 
2 
(539,351) 
Size of govern-
ment, WB  
Government expenses (including consumption and 
transfers) relative to GDP, World Bank, “World 
Development Indicators”, April 2009 version.  
26.85 
(31.64) 
8.97 
(9.00) 
17,582 
(539,351) 
Size of govern-
ment, HF 
Heritage Foundation indicator of government 
expenditures, based on the following formula: 
100 – 0.03 (% Expenses/GDP)2; note sign 
57.89 
(48.65) 
20.52 
(19.98) 
17,582 
(539,351) 
Informal finan-
ce prevalence 
The average percentage of business angels in 
each country-year sub-sample (authors’calculation) 
4.26 
(2.72) 
3.57 
(2.03) 
17,582 
(539,351) 
Financial 
freedom 
Heritage Foundation  index, scores from 0 to 100, 
with 100 representing the maximum freedom 
69.88 
(71.82) 
17.61 
(17.67) 
17,582 
(539,351) 
Loans from 
non resident 
banks  
Offshore bank loans (AMT outstanding) relative to 
GDP, World Bank “Financial Structure” dataset 
(2008 v.4) 
.45 
(.59) 
.54 
(.55) 
17,582 
(539,351) 
Share of off-
shore deposits 
Offshore bank deposits relative to domestic 
deposits, World Bank “Financial structure” dataset 
.15 
(.15) 
.14 
(.13) 
17,582 
(539,351) 
Remittance 
inflows 
Net remittance inflows as a share of GDP, World 
Bank “Financial Structure” dataset (2008 v.4) 
.018 
(.009) 
.042 
(.024) 
16,747 
(514,805) 
GDP per 
capita 
GDP per capita at purchasing power parity, 
constant at 2005 $USD (WB WDI April 2009) 
23,841 
(27,668) 
13,082 
(10,049) 
17,582 
(539,351) 
GDP growth Annual GDP growth rate (WB WDI April 2009) 3.96 
(3.19) 
2.79 
(2.33) 
17,582 
(539,351) 
 
Personal characteristics: 
Age The exact age of the respondent at time of the 
interview 
38.01 
(44.06) 
11.98 
(16.14) 
17,582 
(539,351) 
Age squared Age squared   17,582 
(539,351) 
Male 1=male, 0 otherwise .64 
(.46) 
.48 
(.16) 
17,582 
(539,351) 
Employment 1=respondent is either in full or part time 
employment, 0  if not 
.81 
(.59) 
.39 
(.49) 
17,582 
(539,351) 
Post-secondary & 
higher education 
1=respondent has a post secondary or higher 
education attainment, 0 otherwise 
.44 
(.35) 
.49 
(.47) 
17,582 
(539,351) 
Higher education 1=respondent has a higher education attainment .21 
(.14)  
.41 
(.35) 
17,582 
(539,351) 
Current owner of 
business 
1=current owner/manager of business, 0 
otherwise 
.17 
(.07) 
.38 
(.25) 
17,582 
(539,351) 
Business angel 1=business angel in past three years, 0 
otherwise 
.13 
(.03) 
.33 
(.16) 
17,582 
(539,351) 
Knows other 
entrepreneurs 
1=personally knows entrepreneurs, in last two 
years, zero if not  
.67 
(n/a) 
.447 
(n/a) 
17,582 
(n/a) 
Opportunity  1=nascent entrepreneur declares an opportunity 
motive, zero otherwise 
.59 
(n/a) 
.49 
(n/a) 
17, 582 
(n/a) 
More than 1 ow-
ner of business 
1=start-up has more than one owner, zero 
otherwise 
.48 
(n/a) 
.50 
(n/a) 
17,582 
(n/a) 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics and definitions of dependent variables 
 
Variable Definition Mean S.D. No of obs 
 
Regression models (start-ups) 
Total funds Volume of total funds  scaled down 
by nominal GDP pc, local currency 
units; only observations with non-
zero finance declared 
24.55 799.09 17,582 
Own funds Volume of own funds scaled down 
by nominal GDP pc, same as 
above 
4.64 169.62 13,719 
External funds The difference between total funds 
and own funds 
12.07 385.55 13,719 
 
Selection models 
Start-up entry 
(selection equation) 
0 = respondent is not engaged in 
start-up activity; 1 = respondent is 
engaged in start-up 
.019 .136 514,805 
Use of external funds 
(outcome equation) 
0 = respondent is engaged in start-
up activity but relies only on own 
funding; 1 = respondent is  
engaged in start-up activity and 
relies on the use of external funds   
.628 .483 13,631 
 
 
Notes to Tables 1 and 2: 
 
1. Source: GEM 2001-2006 unless specified otherwise.  
2. Descriptive statistics for the regression model are based on sub-sample of 
nascent entrepreneurs (start-ups) for which finance information is available. 
Descriptive statistics for the binary-outcome selection model are based on the 
whole sample (entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs). In each cell, the first entry 
corresponds to regression model and descriptive statistics for binary-outcome 
selection model are reported in parentheses. 
3. All statistics are based on the set of observations actually used in estimations 
(i.e. eliminating join effect of missingness in all variables).  
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Table 3: Regression estimation results for start-up total funds scaled down by 
nominal GDP pc 
 
 
Notes:  Country- time effects included;  **** p<0.001, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Independent variables: 
Coeff  
(rob st error)
Coeff  
(rob st error)
Coeff  
(rob st error)
Coeff  
(rob st error) 
Coeff  
(rob st error)
Coeff  
(rob st error)
       
Age 4.606** 4.606** 4.606** 4.679** 4.193** 4.195** 
 (1.809) (1.809) (1.809) (1.946) (1.707) (1.709) 
Age squared -0.045** -0.045** -0.045** -0.046** -0.041** -0.041** 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.019) (0.019) 
Male 27.739*** 27.739*** 27.739*** 27.417*** 26.121*** 26.139*** 
 (9.943) (9.943) (9.943) (10.355) (9.141) (9.152) 
Employment 1.699 1.699 1.699 1.740 -1.765 -1.829 
 (7.593) (7.593) (7.593) (8.107) (6.992) (7.008) 
Post-secondary & higher ed. 44.530** 44.530** 44.530** 43.315** 41.544** 41.699** 
 (20.287) (20.287) (20.287) (21.479) (19.012) (19.048) 
Higher education -25.486 -25.486 -25.486 -21.035 -21.502 -21.781 
 (29.981) (29.981) (29.981) (31.791) (28.258) (28.296) 
Current owner of business 8.115 8.115 8.115 9.280 7.391 7.391 
 (25.605) (25.605) (25.605) (26.823) (23.299) (23.358) 
Business angel 62.471* 62.471* 62.471* 66.973** 57.628* 57.852* 
 (32.191) (32.191) (32.191) (34.048) (29.687) (29.769) 
Knows other entrepreneurs 6.028 6.028 6.028 5.093 4.648 4.529 
 (5.046) (5.046) (5.046) (5.212) (4.791) (4.798) 
Opportunity 4.626 4.626 4.626 3.824 5.091 5.133 
 (12.133) (12.133) (12.133) (12.667) (11.031) (11.056) 
More than one business owner 28.306** 28.306** 28.306** 28.373** 27.031*** 27.041*** 
 (11.307) (11.307) (11.307) (11.786) (10.349) (10.367) 
Informal finance prevalence -1.253 0.279 -2.018 -1.310 -1.062 -1.281 
 (1.575) (1.650) (1.609) (1.627) (1.139) (1.213) 
Financial freedom 0.677*** - - - - - 
 (0.245) - - - - - 
Loans from non-resident banks  578.792*** - - 125.106 - 
  (209.101) - - (176.622) - 
Share of offshore deposits   - -54.408*** - - -45.452*** 
  - (19.656) - - (16.776) 
Remittance inflows  - - 162.622*** - - 
  - - (61.228) - - 
Property rights, Polity IV 9.149 10.229 5.887 7.997 10.122* 12.220* 
 (7.499) (7.726) (6.901) (7.543) (5.890) (6.272) 
Size of government, WB WDI 0.128 1.084 -1.027 -0.089 - - 
 (0.675) (0.785) (0.762) (0.683) - - 
Size of government, HF     0.232 0.468 
     (0.254) (0.347) 
GDP growth 2.678 3.827 2.169 2.108 3.725* 4.672* 
 (2.749) (2.956) (2.673) (2.759) (2.260) (2.453) 
GDP per capita -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Transition -31.724 -34.509 -16.974 -4.020 -20.181 -25.527 
 (23.986) (24.648) (20.943) (19.579) (18.877) (20.155) 
Constant -248.594** -326.447** -125.380 -225.354** -223.965*** -227.168** 
       
 (113.219) (135.643) (84.970) (112.468) (82.806) (88.400) 
Sigma 792.7783 792.778 792.778 805.597 757.039 757.696 
 (224.991) (224.991) (224.991) (232.358) (213.754) (213.944) 
Observations 17,582 17,582 17,582 16,747 19,384 19,350 
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Table 4: Regression estimation results for start-up external and own funds scaled down by 
nominal GDP pc 
 
Dependent variable External funds / nominal GDPpc Own funds / nominal GDPpc 
 Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
Independent variables: (rob.se) (rob.se) (rob.se) (rob.se) (rob.se) (rob.se) 
       
Age 1.921* 1.921* 1.796 0.606 0.606 0.624 
 (1.130) (1.130) (1.195) (0.495) (0.495) (0.516) 
Age squared -0.017 -0.017 -0.016 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Male 9.778** 9.778** 8.240* 4.031** 4.031** 4.185** 
 (4.404) (4.404) (4.219) (1.700) (1.700) (1.782) 
Employment 3.960 3.960 3.837 2.881 2.881 3.160 
 (2.511) (2.511) (2.655) (1.896) (1.896) (2.062) 
Post-secondary & higher 
education 
15.321 15.321 11.340 8.103 8.103 8.561 
 (10.264) (10.264) (9.937) (7.512) (7.512) (8.013) 
Higher education -8.916 -8.916 -0.948 -4.195 -4.195 -4.630 
 (15.184) (15.184) (14.012) (6.157) (6.157) (6.720) 
Current owner of business -1.332 -1.332 0.371 -1.895 -1.895 -2.033 
 (6.964) (6.964) (7.077) (3.956) (3.956) (4.152) 
Business angel 39.272 39.272 43.787* 13.040 13.040 13.752 
 (24.030) (24.030) (25.247) (10.412) (10.412) (11.024) 
Knows other entrepreneurs 6.768* 6.768* 5.431 0.985 0.985 1.035 
 (3.973) (3.973) (3.861) (0.780) (0.780) (0.811) 
Opportunity 11.391** 11.391** 10.944** -3.203 -3.203 -3.414 
 (4.649) (4.649) (4.678) (4.521) (4.521) (4.755) 
More than one business owner 16.052** 16.052** 14.850** 4.087 4.087 4.293 
 (7.265) (7.265) (7.394) (2.592) (2.592) (2.725) 
Informal finance prevalence -0.624 -1.068 -0.897 0.410 0.175 0.473 
 (0.991) (0.969) (0.967) (0.544) (0.506) (0.564) 
Financial freedom 0.393* - - 0.208* - - 
 (0.223) - - (0.118) - - 
Share of offshore deposits  - -31.592* - - -16.722* - 
 - (17.929) - - (9.458) - 
Remittance inflows - - 81.519 - - 52.560* 
 - - (53.168) - - (30.153) 
Property rights, Polity IV 4.030 2.135 2.448 3.237 2.234 3.186 
 (5.750) (5.125) (5.581) (3.633) (3.314) (3.641) 
Size of government, WB WDI 
measure 
0.033 -0.637 -0.187 0.101 -0.254 0.056 
 (0.490) (0.523) (0.466) (0.325) (0.351) (0.322) 
GDP growth 0.629 0.334 0.068 1.538 1.382 1.468 
 (2.021) (1.933) (1.955) (1.295) (1.247) (1.281) 
GDP per capita -0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Transition -1.678 6.887 15.767 -14.160 -9.626 -6.314 
 (26.519) (23.731) (22.176) (12.280) (10.416) (9.286) 
Constant -125.963 -54.417 -93.018 -67.609 -29.740 -65.287 
 (91.891) (63.407) (86.730) (52.925) (39.064) (52.451) 
       
Sigma 383.908 383.908 375.511 169.142 169.142 173.249 
 (136.146) (136.146) (144.991
) 
(79.138) (79.138) (81.056) 
Observations 13,719 13,719 13,075 13,719 13,719 13,075 
 
Notes:       Country-time effects included; **** p<0.001, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5: Binary-outcome selection model without exclusion restrictions 
  
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Selection Outcome Selection Outcome Selection Outcome 
 
Dependent variable: The use of external finance conditional on startup entry 
 
Age 0.024**** 0.015**** 0.024**** 0.015**** 0.027**** 0.018**** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Age squared -0.000**** -0.000**** -0.000**** -0.000**** -0.000**** -0.000**** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Male 0.263**** 0.269**** 0.260**** 0.269**** 0.257**** 0.265**** 
 (0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.011) 
Employment 0.206**** 0.196**** 0.211**** 0.206**** 0.219**** 0.211**** 
 (0.011) (0.013) (0.011) (0.013) (0.011) (0.013) 
Post-secon.& higher ed. 0.094**** 0.077**** 0.097**** 0.079**** 0.093**** 0.074**** 
 (0.011) (0.013) (0.011) (0.013) (0.011) (0.013) 
Higher education 0.088**** 0.092**** 0.094**** 0.095**** 0.104**** 0.105**** 
 (0.013) (0.016) (0.013) (0.016) (0.014) (0.016) 
Current owner of busin. 0.118**** 0.106**** 0.118**** 0.104**** 0.117**** 0.105**** 
 (0.014) (0.016) (0.014) (0.016) (0.014) (0.017) 
Business angel 0.497**** 0.467**** 0.496**** 0.468**** 0.487**** 0.455**** 
 (0.017) (0.019) (0.017) (0.019) (0.017) (0.020) 
Informal finance preval. 0.062**** 0.070**** 0.069**** 0.076**** 0.074**** 0.081**** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Financial freedom 0.003**** 0.002**** - - - - 
 (0.000) (0.000) - - - - 
Loans, non-resid. banks - - 0.066**** 0.097**** - - 
 - - (0.011) (0.013) - - 
Remittance inflows - - - - -0.693**** -0.591*** 
 - - - - (0.162) (0.182) 
Property rights 0.055**** 0.068**** 0.075**** 0.089**** 0.096**** 0.122**** 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) 
Size of government, WB  -0.017**** -0.014**** -0.017**** -0.015**** -0.015**** -0.012**** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
GDP growth -0.015**** -0.008*** -0.018**** -0.010**** -0.021**** -0.012**** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
GDP per capita -0.000**** -0.000**** -0.000**** -0.000**** -0.000**** -0.000**** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Transition -0.112**** -0.124**** -0.090**** -0.102**** -0.119**** -0.154**** 
 (0.022) (0.027) (0.022) (0.027) (0.022) (0.027) 
Constant -2.716**** -2.859**** -2.724**** -2.920**** -2.893**** -3.204**** 
 (0.056) (0.065) (0.057) (0.066) (0.063) (0.074) 
       
Observations 539,351 539,351 514,805 
 
Notes: **** p<0.001, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Figure 1: Median amount of total finance in USD and GDP per capita (purchasing 
power parity) 
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Figure 2: Median amount of total finance for start-up (USD) and offshore deposits 
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Figure 3: Median amount of own funds for start-up (% of nominal GDP pc ppp) and 
GDP growth 
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